A domain like web.irld.net can become inaccessible for reasons unrelated to a server outage. DNS blocking orchestrated by an internet service provider, enhanced filtering by ANSSI under the military programming law 2024-2030, or a simple protocol error in the address bar: the technical causes are numerous and rarely explained in consumer guides.
DNS Filtering and Judicial Blocking: What Really Prevents Access to web.irld.net
The majority of blocks in France rely on filtering at the DNS resolver level of the operators. When a court orders the blocking of a domain, ISPs (Orange, Free, SFR, Bouygues) modify their resolvers so that the DNS request no longer returns the IP address of the target server. The browser then displays an error page or a redirect.
Since the orders from the Paris Judicial Court in July 2026, the scope of these injunctions has expanded. The decisions now target not only ISPs but also public DNS providers and certain search engines. Using an alternative DNS like Google Public DNS or Cloudflare no longer guarantees circumvention.
At the same time, decree n° 2024-421 of May 10, 2024, enacted under the military programming law 2024-2030, grants ANSSI the power to impose a block on domain names deemed malicious on hosts, registrars, and data center operators. A domain can thus be filtered not for its editorial content but because it is associated with suspicious infrastructure.
We recommend first checking if the domain is indeed resolved by a third-party DNS before seeking other solutions. A simple online DNS resolution test (dig, nslookup, or an equivalent web tool) can confirm or rule out a block at this level. A detailed guide explains how to access web.irld.net without error by correcting the most common causes.
Protocol Error in the URL: The Trap of the htpp Prefix Instead of https
A significant portion of connection failures to web.irld.net stems from a typo in the URL scheme. Typing “htpp” instead of “http” or “https” triggers an immediate error from the browser, which does not recognize the protocol.
Modern browsers (Chrome, Firefox, Edge) attempt to automatically add the “https://” prefix when no scheme is specified. However, if an invalid scheme is manually entered, this automatic correction does not apply. The browser interprets “htpp://web.irld.net” as an unknown protocol and blocks the request before it even reaches the network.
The solution is straightforward: remove any manually entered prefix and let the browser handle the protocol negotiation, or explicitly type “https://web.irld.net”. This action alone eliminates a good portion of accessibility reports.
Changing DNS Resolver to Bypass an Operator Block
When filtering is confirmed at the ISP level and the domain is not subject to an injunction extended to public DNS, switching to a third-party resolver remains the most reliable method. Here are the most commonly used resolvers in a professional environment:
- Cloudflare (1.1.1.1 and 1.0.0.1): low latency, no-log policy beyond 24 hours, native DNS-over-HTTPS support
- Google Public DNS (8.8.8.8 and 8.8.4.4): wide anycast coverage, DNSSEC compatible, but subject to recent French judicial injunctions
- Quad9 (9.9.9.9): integrated filtering of malicious domains via threat intelligence, which can paradoxically block a legitimate domain if it shares infrastructure with reported resources
Configuration is done in the network settings of the operating system or directly in the browser (Firefox offers a DNS-over-HTTPS setting independent of the system). On mobile, Android and iOS have a “Private DNS” field in the advanced Wi-Fi settings.
Limitations of Changing DNS in 2026
We observe that recent blocking orders explicitly target public resolvers. The Paris Judicial Court issued decisions in July 2026 requiring third-party DNS providers to block certain domains. This development reduces the effectiveness of the method for domains subject to an active judicial procedure.
VPN and Encrypted Tunnel: When DNS Is No Longer Enough
If the block persists after changing DNS, resorting to a VPN with an encrypted tunnel remains effective. The VPN encapsulates all traffic, including DNS requests, in an encrypted channel to a server located outside the jurisdiction of the block. The resolver used is that of the VPN provider, not that of the ISP or the locally configured one.
Two technical points deserve attention:
- The kill switch must be enabled to prevent any DNS leak if the VPN connection drops. Without this protection, the system reverts to the ISP’s resolver, and the block resumes instantly
- Some corporate or university networks block the ports used by standard VPN protocols (OpenVPN on port 1194, WireGuard on 51820). Using a VPN capable of operating on port 443 (TCP) allows circumventing this filtering by blending in with standard HTTPS traffic
- The European proposal for rapid dismantling of illegal flows, documented by TechRadar, plans to include VPNs in the scope of blocking measures, which could reduce their effectiveness in the medium term
Browser Cache and HSTS: Client-Side Blocks Often Ignored
A final point rarely covered: the browser itself can prevent access to web.irld.net. The HSTS (HTTP Strict Transport Security) mechanism retains in memory domains that have declared to respond only over HTTPS. If the domain’s SSL certificate has expired or changed, the browser refuses the connection without the possibility of bypassing via the “Continue despite the warning” button.
Clearing the browser’s HSTS cache (accessible via chrome://net-internals/#hsts in Chrome) and deleting browsing data related to the domain resolves the issue when the certificate has been renewed in the meantime. An outdated local DNS cache produces the same effect: the command “ipconfig /flushdns” on Windows or “sudo dscacheutil -flushcache” on macOS forces the system to query the resolver again.
The blocking of a domain like web.irld.net almost always results from the combination of several layers: operator filtering, typing error, outdated local cache. Addressing each layer separately, in order, avoids deploying a VPN where a simple DNS flush would have sufficed.